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Dynamic dictators: Elite cohesion 








There is a need to improve concepts and research frameworks on authoritarianism and 
authoritarian resilience. Democratization used to be the dominant trend from the 1980s until 
roughly 2007, which drove scholars to study regime changes, leaving stable authoritarian 
regimes poorly studied (Freedom House 2019; Geddes et al. 2018). Yet authoritarian resil-
ience should be puzzling if we assume that lack of electoral representation significantly 
weakens regime legitimacy. Dickson argued in 2016 that ‘much of the recent literature on 
the survival of authoritarian regimes has limited applicability to China’ (Dickson 2016: 5).
Currently the number of liberal democracies is in decline and the third wave of autoc-
ratization is here, creating new interest in authoritarian practices (Lührmann & Lindberg 
2019). Autocratization does not happen only in democracies, although such processes have 
recently received most attention. Autocratization also takes place in already authoritarian 
countries. In order to form a comprehensive understanding of quality of governance glob-
ally, it is important to better conceptualize and study deepening authoritarianism in authori-
tarian regimes and how variation in authoritarian practices may be related to authoritarian 
resilience.
This chapter aims to demonstrate with Chinese empirical examples that authoritarian 
regimes are not static. On the contrary, it is precisely the adjustments dictatorships make all 
the time that keep these regimes in power. To paraphrase Acemoglu and Robinson (2019), 
authoritarian governance takes place in a narrow corridor. Staying in that narrow corridor 
requires a right balance of control: There has to be enough control to avoid revolutions and 
coup attempts, but not too much control which might prevent economic activities. Balance 
maintenance entails a red queen effect, meaning pressure to adapt faster to changing condi-
tions. Democratization is only one alternative for a particular type of authoritarian rule, as a 
party-based authoritarian system can become a military junta for example, or an authoritarian 
regime might simply change their top leaders. Regime stability, be it democratic or auto-
cratic, signifies that the leadership has at least for the time being found a political equilibrium.
To make authoritarian dynamism visible, the starting point of research should be 
factors that tend to vary among authoritarian regimes, meaning that authoritarianism 
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should not be approached only as lack of democratic traits. If we wish to understand 
authoritarian resilience, we need to give up the idea that we could meaningfully place all 
regimes on a one-dimensional continuum, with democratic governments in the one end 
and authoritarian governments in the other end. Analytic tools developed for studying 
democracies are not sufficient to account for the variance of governance relevant vari-
ables in authoritarian regimes.
New research provides partial responses to three gaps on the research agenda of authori-
tarian regimes. First, we should embrace equifinality and focus on the combination of causes 
and their interactions rather than effects of individual causes when studying authoritarian 
resilience. In this respect, research conducted by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) pro-
vides the so far most ambitious explanation of authoritarian resilience. Geddes et al. (2018) 
acknowledge that factors affecting authoritarian resilience are likely to involve interacting 
causal variables that are not independent of each other.
Second, Geddes et al.’s research findings help to understand ways in which economic 
factors affect different types of authoritarian regimes and their resilience. Empirical evi-
dence shows that the relationship between wealth and regime type is not simple. As the 
level of development rises, authoritarian regimes, like democratic ones, become more stable 
(Geddes 2003: 83). Londregan and Poole (1990) have found that the best predictor of coups 
in all regimes is poverty. By studying the effects of economic downturns in combination 
with regime types, Geddes et al. (2018: 190) conclude that economic downturns increase 
likelihood of collapse in dictatorships that lack extensive party networks. Put the other way 
around, extensive party networks stabilize authoritarian regimes even when the regime is 
faced with economic crises.
Furthermore, existing comparative research analyzing the economic origins of regime 
types tends to attach only positive attributions to economic growth acquired via industrial 
activities and innovations, and reserve the innovative and industrious growth model to 
Western democracies. Yet, as Zuboff (2015) argues, data has become a new form of capital 
and authoritarian regimes may have a comparative advantage in extracting large amounts of 
it; therefore, our understanding of authoritarian toolkits needs to be updated. Digital revo-
lution and digital capitalism bring with them transnational elements which will transform 
politics in democracies and autocracies alike.
Third, Geddes et al.’s (2018) research sheds light on the connection between authoritar-
ian resilience and the increase in authoritarian governance practices. Their findings help to 
clarify that stabilizing factors are regime dependent and deepening authoritarianism does 
not automatically increase regime resilience. Geddes et al. (2018: 85) report that dictators 
who score high on personalism scale during their first three years in office are much more 
likely to stay in power than dictators with low early personalism scores. Yet their overall 
finding is that personalization decreases regime durability in party-based regimes, while it 
increases regime durability in military-based regimes (Geddes et al. 2018: 198). In other 
words, leaders of party-based regimes would increase their chances of staying in power 
if they would share power after having made it through the difficult regime consolidation 
phase, which in China often takes a few years. During this consolidation phase, the new 
regime is especially vulnerable to elite struggles, which increases the likelihood that the 
regime will resort to their repressive toolkit (Zheng 2010: 71–97).
In literature concentrating solely on China, the relationship of power concentration and 
regime durability is hotly debated. Researchers disagree whether increased power concen-
tration is a sign of regime strength or weakness. In 2003 Nathan argued that the CCP demon-
strated important signs of institutionalization as the leadership managed to create peaceful, 
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timely and stable leadership succession when Hu Jintao became the general secretary of the 
CCP in November 2002. Others who have found significant evidence of system adaptability 
include Yang (2004) and Shambaugh (2008).
For Nathan (2003), gradual institutionalization has contributed to regime resilience in 
China. Nathan’s position would align with Geddes et al.’s (2018) finding that power-shar-
ing would be a wise strategy in party-based regimes. Later, Fewsmith and Nathan (2019) 
argued that party institutionalization has been ‘considerably overstated’. For Fewsmith, 
the authoritarian model has proven resilient due to a return to a hierarchical model in 
which the execution of rules is personalistic on all levels and the leadership avoids giving 
too much power to the bureaucracy, not because of institutionalization. While Fewsmith’s 
stance would seem to be in contradiction with the above-mentioned general finding of 
Geddes et al. we might have to conclude that the jury is still out to decide whose descrip-
tion is more accurate. If we take into account that in social sciences it is not often pos-
sible to find general laws holding despite changing historical circumstances, it may be 
that both Nathan and Fewsmith are partly right. The dataset Geddes et al. (2018) used 
in their study ends in the year 2010, which is unfortunate given that in many countries’ 
authoritarian tendencies have intensified since then. Yet, despite China’s deepened auto-
cratization, CCP is still in power and there are no signs of any credible resistance to its 
rule. There is recent empirical evidence to support Fewsmith’s position, which finds the 
source of resilience in increased control and personalism. Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and 
Wright (2020) state that popular protests have become a more significant challenge to 
authoritarian regimes between 2001 and 2017. Consequently, the relative weight in effec-
tive strategies of political survival might have shifted to societal factors, and keeping the 
elite satisfied by power-sharing has perhaps lost some of its relevance. If the Chinese 
regime has studied these same trends, they may have changed their tactics and improved 
the likelihood of remaining in power. In order to better understand the changes that have 
taken place in China since 2010, it is useful to delve deeper into different aspects of 
power concentration.
Measuring power concentration
Understanding variation in key sectors of authoritarian rule will help in answering to the 
puzzling question of what explains authoritarian resilience and how the regime might find 
political equilibrium.
There is a great deal of variation in the level and style of authoritarianism between the 
Jiang Zemin (1989–2002), Hu (2002–2012) and Xi (2012–) regimes. Shambaugh (2016) 
divides Chinese regimes since 1985 into four types of authoritarianism ranging from neoto-
talitarian to softly authoritarian. The so-called fang-shou cycle (放收周期) of political open-
ing and tightening characterizes Chinese politics (Shambaugh 2016: 98). On a very general 
level, trends of authoritarian control in China suggest that after the Tiananmen Incident 
(1989) domestic control increased and started to gradually get lighter again after 1992. The 
Hu regime preceding Xi was generally characterized as much more consultative than earlier 
regimes and repression was less visible on the societal level. Hu experimented cautiously 
with a more consultative approach by promoting intraparty democracy and expanding the 
number of official actors influencing leadership decisions on foreign policy, which as a 
policy area has been strictly restricted (Jakobson & Knox 2010; Shirk 2018: 32; Sinkkonen 
2014). During the Xi regime China has returned to harsher control with clear concentration 
tendencies of political rule (Shirk 2018).
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While it is useful to grasp the overall trend of authoritarianism in China over the 
years, we need to delve deeper into characteristics of authoritarian governance if we 
wish to improve our understanding of how political equilibrium enabling authoritarian 
resilience might be found. As the first step towards forming such an understanding, ele-
ments of authoritarian governance have to be described in detail and measured if possi-
ble. Aspects of authoritarian rule that tend to vary according to scholars of authoritarian 
regimes include power concentration within the elite and domestic repression (Geddes 
2003; Geddes et al. 2018; Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Slovik 2012). Deepening auto-
cratization would thus be a process of increasing either power concentration or domestic 
repression or both.
Figure 8.1 summarizes measures authoritarian leaders can take with regards to elites 
and the wider society. It is notable that there can simultaneously be policies increasing 
and decreasing autocratization, meaning that not all aspects that can vary will necessarily 
move in the same direction at the same time. On the elite level, authoritarian leadership 
can increase or decrease power concentration, which can be measured with personaliza-
tion, administrative centralization, and state control over economic assets. Some scholars of 
authoritarian regimes have defined cooptation as one tool to maintain authoritarian stability 
(Gerschewski 2013; Schmotz 2015; Svolik 2012). In what is discussed below, parts of the 
often used cooptation measures are included in the personalization index (security appara-
tus), administrative centralization, and state control over economic assets (capital, labor, 
and land ownership). As the role of the economy in regime maintenance is broader than 
buying off powerful groups, it is not enough to talk about cooptation.
On the societal level, authoritarian leadership can increase or decrease repression. 
Repression is costly and increasing repression risks angering apolitical people (Dickson et 
al. 2017). This is why nondemocratic regimes try to build regime legitimacy and to have 
Figure 8.1  Dimensions of authoritarian rule and autocratization.
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active consent, rule obedience or sometimes mere toleration for their rule within the popula-
tion (Gerschewski 2013: 14; Maerz 2020). Leaders can increase public support by building 
legitimacy through measures enhancing in-group coherence and applying welfare policies.
This chapter concentrates on power concentration on the elite level. I will present below 
three areas of power concentration which are relevant in the Chinese case and likely to be 
applicable to also other authoritarian contexts: personalization, administrative centraliza-
tion, and state control over key economic assets.
Personalization
A dictator wants the minimum support needed to survive, but no more, as he has to com-
pensate support either by sharing power or giving out resources (Geddes et al. 2018: 78; de 
Mesquita et al. 2003: 100). Thus, he has incentives to concentrate power in his own hands 
as much as possible. While personalization can sometimes refer to building of a personality 
cult of some sort, here personalization signifies measurable features of power concentration. 
Geddes et al.’s (2018: 79–80) measurement for personalization includes:
dictator’s personal control of the security apparatus, creation of loyalist paramilitary 
forces, dictator’s control of the composition of the party executive committee, the party 
executive committee behaving as a rubber stamp, dictator’s personal control of appoint-
ments, dictator’s creation of a new party to support the regime, dictator’s control of 
military promotions, and dictator’s purges of officers.
In their research, Geddes et al. calculate a yearly personalism score for each regime making 
it possible to show variation during a single dictator’s tenure. Before this, ‘personaliza-
tion has never been so carefully and consistently measured across regimes and across time’ 
(Pepinsky 2019).
Drawing from Geddes et al.’s definition above, I discuss personalism in China from the 
perspective of institutional arrangements in existing institutions, innovation of new insti-
tutions, and purges of opponents. In the party-state system, the most powerful position, 
general secretary of the Communist Party of China, is accompanied by the state presidency 
and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairmanship (Wang 2017: 5). A new leader’s 
power position in China can be assessed in part based on when they are named as chairman 
of the CMC (Miller 2014: 9; Nathan 2003), as that does not always happen at the same 
time as assuming the other two positions. Xi was able to get all top positions at once in 
comparison to his predecessors Hu and Jiang, who both had to wait for the CMC chairman-
ship. Composition and size of the Politiburo Standing Committee can also offer clues on the 
number of supporters a leader has managed to promote there. In 2002, the size of Politburo 
Standing Committee was expanded from seven to nine members because Hu wanted to 
enhance collective leadership. In 2012 when Xi came to power, the Politburo Standing 
Committee was reduced back to seven members and internal security as a policy sector 
was dropped altogether (Miller 2015: 66–68). In 2018 China rearranged its ministries and 
diminished the total amount of ministerial-level bodies by eight and vice ministerial-level 
by seven (Xinhua 2018). As the most telling example of increased personalism, the National 
People’s Congress abolished term limits for the president in March 2018, which indicates 
that Xi might be planning to stay in power after 2022 (Shirk 2018: 32).
In addition to ensuring support in the party and state organizations, securing the loyalty 
of the military is one of the most important tasks of Chinese leaders. If the military gets 
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too powerful, it will get political leverage which can be used against the leadership. The 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is overviewed by the CMC, which is chaired by the gen-
eral secretary of the CCP, and there are also other mechanisms to secure power balance. 
PLA has, for example, political commissars and party committees, which should play a role 
in all key decisions (Saunders & Wutnow 2016). Since 1992, there has been a limitation of 
maximum two PLA representatives in the Politburo, to make sure that the general secretary 
is not using the PLA members as his power base (Miller 2015: 73). In the more influential 
Politburo Standing Committee, there has been no PLA officer since 1997 (Li 2015: 120). In 
addition to these administrative forms of party control, Xi has promoted his followers to top 
positions and frequency of post rotation in the PLA has intensified during the Xi era, argu-
ably to prevent plots (Kou 2017: 878–879). As PLA officers do not have job security, and 
their evaluation process is perceived as somewhat unfair and being based on personal likes 
and dislikes (Ledberg 2018), they are vulnerable to intensified political control.
Xi started the biggest military reforms since 1949 in 2015. PLA reform had multiple 
motivations including military modernization and ensuring more functional chains of com-
mand. Yet the personalistic power concentration aspect of the reforms is clear. The tangible 
changes include reduction of the number of military districts from seven to five, reforms 
of the military command structure, strengthening Xi’s role within the CMC by emphasiz-
ing the so-called chairman responsibility system (军委主席负责制) which highlights final 
say of the chairman and slimming down the CMC from eleven to seven members in 2017 
(Mulvenon 2016, 2018; Kou 2017: 866–867). Finally, a prominent feature during the Xi era 
has been the promotion of his public image as a strong military leader. This trend has been 
visible in the great number of visits he has made to garrisons (Kou 2017: 873).
Xi has also been active in institutional innovation. He started his term by creating new 
political bodies, such as the National Security Commission (NSC, 中央国家安全委员会) 
in January 2014. Xi’s aim in establishing the NSC, which supervises both foreign and 
domestic security issues, was to concentrate power in his own hands and to improve policy 
coordination (Lampton 2015). You (2016: 183) sees Xi’s establishment of NSC during his 
first year at office as a clear sign of Xi’s strong power position. While the need to improve 
coordination and establishing NSC had been talked about for decades, Hu did not even try 
such a move and Jiang failed to do it during his years in office. Xi also leads several other 
new central committee or central commission level decision-making bodies that have been 
upgraded from the leading small groups existing before 2017 (Wu 2018).
In China, it is common for leaders to start anticorruption measures in the beginning of 
the term. Anticorruption measures are useful for authoritarian leaders to remove opponents 
from powerful positions. When anticorruption gets politicized, it is more common to target 
the opponent’s support network, usually mid- to low-level officials, rather than the main 
competitor himself (Zhu and Zhang 2017: 1190). The armed forces have usually been left 
out of such maneuvers, with a few notable exceptions. In the beginning of Jiang’s term, 
his power in the PLA was constrained by the so-called ‘Yang family clan’. In 1992, Jiang 
managed to purge the Yang brothers Yang Baibing and Yang Shankun from their military 
positions with the help of Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, Jiang reshuffled more than 300 senior 
officers and 1000 regional commanders throughout the country to establish his authority 
(Gilley 1998: 196).
Yet, Xi took anticorruption measures to a whole new level when compared with his 
predecessors (Chen 2020: 143). Xi launched the anticorruption campaign in late 2012. 
Not only did the campaign target exceptionally numerous high-level officials or ‘tigers’, 
it also reformed the institutional structures of anticorruption work. In 2014 Xi broke 
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the unwritten rule of not going after former Politburo Standing Committee members by 
purging Zhou Yongkang, former standing committee member, who was sentenced to life 
imprisonment for corruption. (Liu 2019: 51–55). In late 2017, the CCP Central Discipline 
Inspection Commission, headed by Xi’s close ally Wang Qishan, had punished almost 
1.4 million party members including 17 Central Committee members and two sitting 
Politburo members (Shirk 2018: 24). The width and breadth of the campaign in the PLA 
was also unprecedented. The two former vice chairmen of the CMC, Xu Caihou and Guo 
Boxiong, were both ousted. In the early 2015, Chinese leadership announced investiga-
tions of 30 senior military officials on serious corruption charges. While the main objec-
tive of the campaign was evidently to remove any officers who were close to Xu and 
Guo, there has been some moderation as no princeling was targeted. Also, the majority of 
highest-ranking officers accused had retired whereas those faced with corruption charges 
while in active service have been mostly at the deputy army level (Chen 2020: 150–151; 
Kou 2017: 876–878).
Finally, the party established the National Supervision Commission in 2018 as part of 
a wider reform of the anticorruption system. In these reforms the party aimed for a single 
anticorruption agency system instead of a dual-track system, in which discipline inspection 
subbranches at provincial, municipal, county, and township levels were under dual leader-
ship of the local party branches and their higher-level anticorruption organs. While the legal 
side of anticorruption work was also reformed, the key de facto outcome of the reforms is 
that central CCP’s control was consolidated and local party leadership’s role diminished 
(Chen 2020; Deng 2018). National Supervision Commission can also stretch the anticorrup-
tion measures to state employees, meaning that the politicized anticorruption campaign does 
not concern only party members (Shirk 2018: 24).
Administrative centralization
While personalism is certainly a key aspect of power concentration in authoritarian regimes, 
it is not the only one. There is also variation regarding power-sharing between regional 
administration and the central government. Hess (2013: 36–37) argues that ‘modern author-
itarian cases might be disaggregated into centralized and decentralized types’. Hess (2017: 
21) defines decentralization as the transfer of state authority and resources from national 
governments to the subnational level. For a numeric measurement for decentralization, it 
is possible to use the International Monetary Fund’s cross-national Fiscal Decentralization 
Dataset from which one can track the percentage of revenues controlled by subnational 
governments (IMF 2019).
Authoritarian regimes are generally reluctant to decentralize. However, there are a few 
notable exceptions such as China and Kazakhstan. The logic behind decentralization is that 
by granting local officials greater authority within their jurisdiction, the centre avoids blame 
for local authorities’ official misdeeds and their use of repression. Relative to their more 
centralized counterparts, decentralized regimes often exhibit higher levels of durability in 
the face of popular challenges (Hess 2013: 37; Landry 2008: 9–10). It is part of CCP’s delib-
erate strategy to blame local governments for general problems and enjoy support at the top. 
According to public opinion surveys, support and trust in the leadership is indeed polarized: 
Chinese tend to support the central government more than local leadership (Dickson et al. 
2017: 131–134). History of cultural revolution era intensified fear of chaos in Chinese soci-




China has decentralized a great deal in the past decades, as thanks to fiscal decentraliza-
tion, subnational expenditures jumped from 45% in 1981 to 85% in 2013. This is exceptional 
among nondemocracies where government expenditures at the subnational level tend to be 
below 18% (Hess 2017: 21–22; Landry 2008: 6). Yet, centralization and decentralization 
go in tides. Decentralization has had clear advantages as it contributed to economic perfor-
mance since the early 1980s (Hess 2013: 33). In the late 1980s and early 1990s China’s fis-
cal reforms led to institutional development labelled local state corporatism which merged 
state and economy (Oi 1992). The Hu-Wen administration launched a rural development 
program, ‘Building a New Socialist Countryside’, abolished agricultural tax in 2006, and 
applied fiscal transfers from wealthier provinces to the less developed areas (Ahlers et al. 
2015). During Xi’s regime from 2012 onwards China has recentralized its administration 
and the anticorruption campaign has constrained local level initiative (Hess 2017: 28). 
The centralization tendency has also been strengthened by provincial debt crisis, to which 
central authorities have responded by initiating reforms which considerably limit financial 
resources available for local governments (Naughton 2015). Despite changing levels of 
decentralization, Ahlers et al. (2015) emphasize that including the local level in the analyses 
of Chinese authoritarian resilience remains essential.
State control over economic assets
In many authoritarian regimes, it is not enough for the leaders to control the security appa-
ratus. Often economic elites need to be controlled as well. Authoritarian leaderships have 
to balance between supporting economic growth in their country and avoiding opposition 
forces, which can form around powerful economic actors. The relationship economic fac-
tors have with authoritarian resilience depends on regime type, as in resource-rich autocra-
cies it is possible to buy off citizens with generous welfare benefits and low taxation. Some 
resource-poor party-based regimes such as North Korea rely essentially on other counties’ 
assistance in providing sustenance (Smith 2015: 294–311) and can use harsh coercion to 
suppress any emerging opposition. Large party-based regimes such as China do not have the 
option of expecting economic assistance from others, which is why economic growth has 
been and continues to be important in building regime legitimacy.
The Chinese economic model has enabled decades-long economic growth without 
regime change. While there is a lively debate on what the ‘China model’ is and whether 
it even exists (Zhao 2010), according to Breslin (2011: 1341) China model discourse pro-
vides backing for CCP’s leadership, as the idea about Chinese exceptionalism ‘explains why 
China does not have to follow anything – including any path that sees democratization as an 
inevitable consequence of economic liberalization’.
When China started its reform and opening up period in 1978, new policies were adopted 
gradually and first in special economic zones. Gallagher (2002) argues that maintaining 
political control over timing and sequencing of liberalization of foreign direct investments is 
the key in understanding why economic growth has not led to regime change in China. From 
the 1990s until 2012, China’s GDP growth averaged around 10% yearly, leading to rising 
prosperity especially in the Eastern provinces (World Bank). Although the middle class is 
seen as a key social agent for democratization, in China’s case emergence of a middle class 
has not shaken CCP rule. There is ample public opinion research showing that the Chinese 
middle class demonstrates a remarkably high-level support for the regime (Chen & Dickson 
2010; Dickson 2016). Dickson (2016) states that under Xi’s leadership economic growth is 
no longer a reliable source of popular support and the party’s survival strategy has become 
 121
 Dynamic dictators
more diversified. Family income predicts regime support better than GDP growth: if family 
income rises, the regime can maintain support despite declining GDP figures. Perhaps these 
dynamics have contributed to the current leadership’s decision to continue poverty allevia-
tion measures initiated during Hu’s regime. Poverty alleviation through development was 
added on the government’s working agenda in 2014 (Xinhua 2014).
China’s development model has many features ensuring party control. Tsai and Naughton 
(2015: 18–19) list seven characteristics of Chinese state capitalism: direct central control of 
strategic sectors, state control over finance, market foundation, industrial policy, party con-
trol of personnel, regulatory fragmentation and layering, and a dualistic welfare regime. Of 
these, the first five are especially relevant in building an understanding of China’s economic 
model which has enabled both authoritarian resilience and economic growth. Strategic 
sectors include telecommunications, electricity, petroleum, defense industries and finance 
(ibid.: 18). Pettis (2013) argues that a considerable share of China’s GDP growth over the 
years has been accomplished by a consumption-repressive investment-driven model, which 
is not sustainable in the long run. In China’s growth strategy, state control over finances has 
played a key role: interest rates have been kept low, wage growth remained moderate for a 
long time, and currency undervalued. These factors have forced the savings rate up, provid-
ing the state fuel for its lavish investment policy (Pettis 2013). The banking sector has been 
strictly regulated and the state owns the majority of shares in the five biggest commercial 
banks (Stent 2017: 10). This strategy has been changing slowly and the state has tried to 
increase the domestic consumption share of GDP.
While ‘most of the economy runs on market principles’ and foreign-invested companies 
play a big role in some sectors (Tsai & Naughton 2015: 18), the share of state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) of China’s GDP was estimated to be between 23% and 28% in 2017 (Zhang 
2019: 10). Yet another matter is that the role of SOEs cannot be understood without tak-
ing into account the broader model of state capitalism. Milhaupt and Zheng (2015) argue 
that the distinction between SOEs and privately-owned enterprises (POEs) has been greatly 
exaggerated as functionally SOEs and POEs share many similarities. Both can dominate the 
market, receive state subsidies, have close connections with the CCP, and execute govern-
ment’s policy objectives.
In recent years, China’s industrial policy has emphasized support of innovation in stra-
tegically important sectors in which certain companies will receive preferential treatment 
and state subsidies (Kenderdine 2017; Wübbeke et al. 2016). ‘Innovation-driven devel-
opment’ has become a key priority in the Xi era, manifested for example in the Made in 
China 2025 plan (中国制造 2025), which was launched in 2015 (National Manufacturing 
Strategy Advisory Committee 2015). The plan highlighted ten priority sectors including 
robotics, information technology, aircraft, aerospace technology, and pharmaceuticals, in 
which China aims for global dominance by 2025 using a strategy combining import sub-
stitution and generous state financing. Xi’s industrial policy has not been received well 
abroad, as can be seen in China’s ongoing trade war with the United States and the sus-
picion many Western actors have about allowing Huawei to construct parts of their 5G 
networks (Rühlig 2020).
As a cross-sectional feature, the Chinese communist party can control all key nomina-
tions including company CEOs and university rectors through its nomenklatura system, 
making sure that only loyal people can get top positions (Brodsgaard 2012). There is a 
revolving door mechanism for cadres circulating them between party positions and state-
owned business positions, both in order to enhance their experience and to restrain their 
personal power by making sure that nobody can stay too long in the same entity (Li 2020: 
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234). Furthermore, the party is integrated in business life as 53% of private and 91% of 
state-owned enterprises have CCP organizations (Zheng and Gore 2020: 1).
When it comes to power concentration in the economic realm, an information technology 
driven social credit system (SCS) is probably the most significant new addition to the com-
munist toolkit in ensuring party control. By collecting data from different sources, social 
credit systems can monitor, assess, and change the behavior of both citizens and companies. 
At the time of writing, there were multiple coexisting SCSs for different purposes at dif-
ferent administrative levels rather than one coherent system. Individuals and companies 
have different systems. In addition, some systems concentrate on creating infrastructure for 
economic and financial activities whereas others are linked more with social governance. 
The People’s Bank of China is in charge of creating a financial social credit system, whereas 
Beihang Credit is the only commercial company dealing with commercial credit rating ser-
vices. In the social governance realm, there are both national and municipal blacklist/redlist 
systems for both individuals and companies (Liu 2019). Punishments for individuals include 
public webpages listing the names of blacklisted people, blocking their credit card use and 
access to high-speed trains and airplanes. Rewards include better interest rates for bank 
loans, discounts from energy bills and renting without deposits (Mistreanu 2018; Liu 2019). 
The corporate social credit system is more developed than the system designed for individu-
als, although the sanctioning mechanisms remains somewhat fragmented when it comes to 
cooperation between local and central level actors. Similarly to individuals, companies are 
rated and blacklisted entities can be found form the credit system’s webpages. Companies 
that get poor ratings can get penalties and restrictions to market access. The system was sup-
posed to be ready in 2020, but as there are problems of data-sharing between different parts 
of the system and sanctioning mechanisms remain underdeveloped, the deadline of 2020 
does not seem plausible (European Chamber 2019).
Concluding remarks
This chapter has described fluctuating levels of autocratization in China using a framework 
concentrating on three dimensions of power concentration: personalization, administrative 
centralization, and state control over economic assets. It has demonstrated that during Xi’s 
reign, there has been a clear tendency of power concentration in all of these three areas. 
The Chinese case is part of an international trend: Geddes et al. (2018) show, that as part of 
deepening autocratization, personalism in autocracies has increased significantly since the 
end of the Cold War. These trends should not be understated, as higher power concentration 
is associated with both increased war-proneness and domestic repression (Frantz et al. 2020; 
Weeks 2012).
The relationship between power concentration and regime resilience is not entirely clear 
as the Nathan–Fewsmith debate illustrates. While elite cohesion has explained authoritarian 
resilience in the past, it is possible that the factors associated with regime endurance will 
change their relative weight in the coming years as popular protests have become more 
significant a challenge to authoritarian regimes (Kendall-Taylor et al. 2020). Chinese gov-
ernment has taken social unrest issues seriously and invested a lot in digital forms of con-
trol such as CCTV cameras with automated facial recognition programmes. In Xinjiang, 
monitoring includes obligatory DNA sampling used for ethnic profiling (Xiao 2019). Xi’s 
regime has built capacity to forecast large-scale popular protests and adapted its political 




Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic presents both opportunities and challenges for 
the Chinese leadership. On the one hand, it provides a convenient reason for restricting mass 
gatherings, as seen in the decision to lengthen Hong Kong’s lockdown in 2020 to prohibit 
June 4 commemoration activities (Tsang et al. 2020). On the other hand, the economic 
downturn following the epidemic hit the Chinese economy hard. During the two sessions in 
May 2020, the leadership decided not to set a GDP growth target for 2020 (Xinhua 2020). 
This is problematic not only for CCP’s performance legitimacy, but the annus horribilis of 
2020 will not give the CCP’s 100-year anniversary in 2021 the kind of background the party 
hoped for. The pandemic has also paved the way for further mobile surveillance. Chinese 
citizens have started to become used to such measures thanks to the social credit system. 
Adding health data to the long list of data the authorities are collecting and using as a basis 
for limiting freedom of movement or other rights has not caused wide-ranging opposition 
in China. China’s experiences of developing surveillance applications may provide Chinese 
companies opportunities to sell such applications abroad. However, data can also cause 
challenges to Chinese authoritarian regime, as it can be used in elite struggles with devastat-
ing effects on regime legitimacy (Zeng 2016).
While the power concentration measures applied in this chapter are useful, future research 
should keep an open mind about the possible ways political equilibrium in China might 
be formed in the coming years. Dynamism described here demonstrates how adaptive the 
party-state has been in the past, but nothing is set in stone. Multiple combinations of causes 
can result in a political equilibrium, and domestic and international conditions change creat-
ing a need for constant adaptation for the party-state. For example, crises of democracy in 
Western countries and the digital revolution influence the Chinese situation. It is likely that 
the tools used for maintaining an equilibrium will change and the relative weight given to 
different components in the combination can fluctuate as well. We need a lot of research in 
the future to understand what kind of conditions trigger changes in the different parameters 
of power concentration. However, it is already an advancement to be able to name some of 
the most important factors that vary in authoritarian governance.
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